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Senator Barry Goldwater v. James Earl Carter
Civil Action No. 78-2412
In the nation's almost two hundred years of constitutional his-
tory, no Court has ever had occasion to rule directly on the respec-
tive roles of the government's two political branches in the process of
treaty termination. However, on December 15, 1978, the President
gave notice of the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). The
treaty had been in effect since March 3, 1955, when it was approved
by the Senate and ratified by President Eisenhower. The unilateral
termination of the treaty by President Carter gave rise to the present
suit.
The Plaintiffs (Senators) fell into two categories: those Senators
who were members of the Senate at the time the Mutual Defense
Treaty was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent; and
those Senators and Congressmen who were currently members of the
United States Senate and United States House of Representatives,
respectively. The Plaintiffs challenged the procedure by which the
right of treaty termination should be accomplished.
The Defendants (Executive Branch) were President James Earl
Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who were being sued in
their official capacities. The President was being sued for failure to
seek the advice and consent of the Senate, or the approval of both
Houses of Congress, in the unilateral termination of the 1954 treaty
with the Republic of China. Secretary Vance was joined as a Defend-
ant for aiding the President in the termination of the 1954 Defense
Treaty. At issue in the case was whether the Plaintiffs were entitled
to a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as a result of the Pres-
ident's unilateral termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.
The Executive Branch moved to dismiss or in the alternative for
summary judgment; they contended that the Senators lacked stand-
ing, and that the suit presented a political question, thereby making
the case nonjusticiable for review. The Senators refuted same and
filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that the
Court had subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants filed a Brief in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Plaintiffs then submitted a Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plain-
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tiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 6, 1979, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered that
the complaint be dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of standing.
Thus, the Senators were given the option of bringing the issue before
the Court at another time.
The Court first addressed the standing issue. In its memorandum
opinion, the Court explained that several decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia expressed the
view that when issues of both standing and political question are to
be considered, the standing issue should be resolved first. The stand-
ing claims in this case were presented by Congressmen. The Court,
citing Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977), stated
that there were no special standards for determining Congressional
standing questions. Thus, the inquiry to be conducted in analyzing
the injuries and interests of the Congressmen was the same as that for
any other Plaintiff. In order to satisfy the two-prong standing re-
quirement, a Plaintiff must allege: (1) an injury in fact; and (2) an
injury that can fairly be traced to the challenged actions of the De-
fendant. Paragraph thirty-four of the Senators' Complaint set forth the
allegations of injury on which they based their standing argument.
The Senators sought, in bringing this action, to maintain the ef-
fectiveness of their voting power and to prevent the circumvention of
their role in treaty termination, the existence of such a situation
being tantamount to their disenfranchisement. The injuries they al-
leged may be divided into two categories, representing the two types
of Plaintiffs seeking relief in this suit: (1) those Senators who are cur-
rent members of the Senate, but who were not members in 1955,
alleged that their constitutional right to vote, and their right to give
advice and consent with respect to the termination of the 1954 Treaty
was denied by the President's unilateral action; and (2) those Senators
who were members of the Senate during 1954-1955 alleged the
aforementioned injury, and in addition, sought to preserve the effec-
tiveness of their initial votes.
In order to meet the burden for demonstrating standing, the
Senators relied heavily on Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), where the District Court of Columbia ruled that a
Senator's vote established a right that a bill become law, unless
vetoed by the President. A presidential pocket veto stripped Senator
Edward M. Kennedy's vote of its effect, and denied him the further
opportunity of overriding the Presidential action through a Congres-
sional procedure. While President Carter's unilateral act of treaty
termination did not deny the Senators and Congressmen their right
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that a bill become law unless vetoed, it did deny the tenured Senators
their right that the treaty continue as law. This may be the crucial
distinction between the standing allegations in Kennedy and the case
at bar. The current members of the Senate lack this element of stand-
ing entirely, since they did not vote on the Treaty initially. Both
groups of Senators, however, like Senator Kennedy, alleged that they
were denied any opportunity to override the treaty termination.
The Senators further alleged standing to seek judicial review of
the Executive circumvention of Section 26 of the International
Security Assistance Act of 1978. This is known as the "Dole-Stone
Amendment" and reads in part:
It is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consulta-
tion between the Congress and the executive branch on any pro-
posed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.
The Senators alleged further injury by virtue of the fact that they
were compelled to consider and act upon remedial legislation de-
signed to reduce the effects of the executive action.
In order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court,
the Senators asserted that the issue of whether the Constitution re-
quired the consent of Congress or the Senate for treaty termination,
or notice resulting in such termination, is a judicial rather than a
political question. They relied on Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), for the proposition that "Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium estab-
lished by our constitutional system."
The Senators set forth a compelling constitutional and historical
argument as to the issue of unilateral treaty termination. They con-
tended that it was not the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
allow the President to unilaterally terminate treaties. Furthermore,
the Senators alleged that their right to be consulted regarding treaty
termination was implicit in their power to enact statutes and treaties
(Article II, Section 2, Clause 2). The Senators also asserted that the
constitutional requirement of checks and balances was necessary,
even in the area of foreign relations. They maintained that both the
enactment and the termination of treaties constituted policy-making
legislative acts.
The Senator's primary argument was an historical one. They ar-
gued that the unilateral treaty termination instigated by President
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Carter was unprecedented in American history, and distinguished the
twelve instances where past presidents unilaterally terminated
treaties as emanating from completely dissimilar factual bases than
those circumstances surrounding the termination of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty with Taiwan. History established an accepted method by
which the United States could terminate treaties with foreign nations,
namely, by Presidential action in conjunction with the action by the
Senate or Congress. This is so even in instances where the treaty
contained notice provisions, such as those found in Article X of the
Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.' Thus, the
Senators maintained that President Carter's action established a
dangerous precedent.
Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that an evil greater than multifari-
ous pronouncements would be the nullification of Congress'
constitutionally-prescribed role in treaty termination. Although there
is express constitutional language as to the Senate's role in treaty
making (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2), there is no express provision
for treaty termination which includes the Senate or Congress. The
Senators were concerned that if this unilateral act of treaty termina-
tion by the President remained unchallenged, they would be elimi-
nated from the process of treaty termination altogether. Such a situa-
tion would seriously affect the system of checks and balances in the
area of foreign relations.
The President, on the other hand, argued that the Senators
failed to allege: (1) a demonstrable injury in fact; or (2) any personal
stake in the controversy, and contended that this failure precluded
the senators from invoking the power of the judiciary to substantiate
their rights. The purpose of the standing requirement, according to
the President, was stated in the fundamental case of Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968), in the following terms: "[To] limit the busi-
ness of the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary con-
text and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process."
The Executive Branch contended further that the Senators failed
to suffer any immediate or automatic injury as did the Plaintiff in
Kennedy. The President's pocket veto, in Kennedy, directly and im-
mediately nullified Senator Kennedy's vote. However, in the instant
1. Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 states: "This Treaty shall
remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has
been given to the other Party."
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case, the President's unilateral treaty termination occurred some
twenty-four years subsequent to the Senators' votes. The Senators
countered that although the President's unilateral treaty termination
did not immediately follow the 1955 vote, his unilateral action did
cause the direct and immediate injuries at issue.
In the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment, they contended that the Court did not have sub-
ject matter jursidiction because the facts indicated that the suit pre-
sented a political question, for the courts have traditionally declined
to adjudicate issues involving the allocation of political powers in the
area of foreign relations. To substantiate their position, the Executive
Branch relied on the Supreme Court cases stating that executive de-
cisions as to foreign policy are political, rather than judicial in nature.
The President cited, for example, the Supreme Court case of
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
215 (1974), for the proposition that "either the absence of standing or
the presence of a political question suffices to prevent the power of
the federal judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party."
In order to defend his action of terminating the treaty with
Taiwan, the President relied on his exclusive power to recognize
foreign governments, found in Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution. The President maintained that the Peoples' Republic of
China (PRC) stipulated that termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taiwan was a condition precedent to the normalization of rela-
tions between the United States and the PRC, thus necessitating his
action under this provision. This contention, however, is factually de-
batable, as evidenced by the conflicting affidavits of Eugene V.
Rostow, Professor of Law at Yale University Law School, and Warren
Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State.
Such considerations are peripheral to the matter at hand, how-
ever, since the issue before the Court was not whether termination of
the Mutual Defense Treaty was necessary in order to normalize rela-
tions with the PRC, but rather the legality of the procedure used to
terminate the treaty. The President insisted that because he alone
can give the formal notice of termination, he alone possesses the
power to make policy decisions as to the termination of treaties. Fi-
nally, the President proffered an historical argument, citing twelve
examples of previous unilateral terminations by Presidents of the
United States.
The President claimed that special circumstances surrounding
the Mutual Defense Treaty itself granted him authority to unilaterally
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terminate the treaty. These factors were fourfold: (1) the termination
was effected pursuant to a specific notice provision which contained
no limitation on the President's traditional authority; (2) the notice
was given incident to the President's recognition powers; (3) the
treaty was one involving defense, and thus represented the exercise of
the President's Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief; and (4)
the treaty was not self-executing and had no impact on domestic law.
The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs lacked standing, basing
their opinion on the availability of alternative political means to ad-
dress the executive action. The Court indicated that the political arena
is the usual forum for legislators seeking to vindicate derivative con-
stitutional rights. If the Senate or the Congress had rejected the Pres-
ident's notice of termination, or asserted a right to participate in the
treaty termination process, the Court would then be confronted with
a clash of the political branches in a posture suitable for judicial re-
view. The Court suggested that the Senate, or Congress as a whole,
utilize the legislative process to assert its right and demonstrate that
it possesses a shared power with the President to act in terminating a
treaty. According to this criteria, the Senators did not establish the
requisite injury for standing.
In addressing the issue of injury under the "Dole-Stone Amend-
ment," the Court held that the nonmandatory language of the
Amendment prevented it from effectively resolving the question of
how much consultation would meet the terms of the Amendment if it
were binding. Therefore, the Senators failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted by alleging injury under this section.
Because the Court dismissed the case on the standing issue, it
did not expressly determine whether the issue before it presented a
political question. However, it noted that resolution of the ultimate
issue in this case should, in the first instance, be in the legislative
forum. At the time this case was pending before the Court, three
resolutions dealing with the same issues were pending before Con-
gress. The Court felt that if Congress, through any of these resolu-
tions, were to approve the President's action, it would moot the case.
It took the approach that only when Congress takes action that falls
short of approving the President's unilateral treaty termination is a
controversy ripe for a judicial declaration respecting the President's
authority to act unilaterally. Thus, the Court implied that it was of the
opinion that the Senators did not present a political question, which
would bar judicial determination of the issue. Rather, the Senators
were held to have presented a question which was not, as yet, ripe
for judicial review.
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Comments as to the merits of the case are unusual once a court
has decided to dismiss a case on the basis of standing. Nevertheless,
the District Court made statements which implicitly indicated its posi-
tion on the merits, despite the fact that it had dismissed the case on a
threshold issue. The Court stated that it believed that the power to
terminate treaties is a power shared by the political branches of
government, namely, the President and Congress. The Court was in-
clined to agree with the Senators' assertion that the power to termi-
nate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty was a shared power to be exer-
cised by the action of both political branches.
It is important to recognize that the Court chose to rule on the
issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter instead of deciding the
issue on the merits. Federal courts often refuse to exercise their
jurisdiction in this manner when they are confronted with sensitive
disputes between the two other branches of government. In addition,
it is a fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that courts
attempt to refrain from ruling on a constitutional issue where possi-
ble. The case at bar was doubly troublesome in that it not only pre-
sented a sensitive constitutional issue involving the balance of power
between branches of government, but involved foreign policy consid-
erations as well. The courts have always deferred to decisions of the
executive branch in the area of foreign policy. The judicial branch is
loathe to substitute its judgment for that of the executive because
inconsistent multifarious pronouncements in an area as sensitive as
foreign relations could cause embarrassment to the United States in
the international sphere under circumstances which present "an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Courts are generally
concerned with the dilatorious effect that inconsistent multifarious
pronouncements will have in the area of foreign relations and there-
fore, will only rule on the merits of foreign relations issues when it is
absolutely essential and cannot be avoided. Furthermore, courts try
to avoid issues which promote intra-governmental discord.
The Court may not postpone consideration of the merits merely
to avoid a confrontation with the other two governmental branches
and to dispense with making a constitutional decision. However, by
first considering the question of standing, courts are relieved from
making unnecessary constitutional determinations. It is essential,
when the court rules on the merits, that the parties before it are true
adversaries-thus, the requirement of standing. Standing ensures
that the issues brought before the court will be sharpened for review
so that the court may make a just determination. The parties must
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have a legal right to sue in order for there to be true conflict. Thus, it
is crucial to note in the Goldwater decision that the Court com-
mented on the merits as well as on whether the issues presented a
nonjusticiable political question, despite its holding that the Senators
lacked standing. These comments imply that the Court considered
the issues justiciable for review but were prevented from ruling ex-
pressly because of the Senators' lack of standing.
Following the Court's Order, the Senators filed a Motion to Alter
or Amend the Judgment of June 6, 1979. In their brief, the Senators
informed the Court that subsequent to publication of the Court's de-
cision, they voted to adopt the "Byrd Resolution" by a vote of
59-35. The Byrd Resolution states: "That it is the sense of the Senate
that approval of the United States is required to terminate any
mutual defense treaty between the United States and another na-
tion." 125 CONG. REC. 7038, 7039 (1979). Senate approval of the
Byrd Resolution demonstrated the Plaintiffs' claim to shared power in
the area of treaty termination. The Senators hoped that this vote
would satisfy the criteria elucidated by the Court for the Senate to
"assert a right to participate in the treaty termination process."
Memorandum Opinion at 9. In addition, the Senators informed the
Court that no amendment had been introduced in the Senate specifi-
cally approving the President's action in unilaterally terminating the
treaty with Taiwan.
The Senators contended that they had standing on the basis of
the Senate vote on the Byrd Resolution. The President's efforts to
add a clause to the resolution, including an endorsement for unilat-
eral Presidential action to end any treaty -including the Mutual De-
fense Treaty-with a notice provision, was defeated. Article X of the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. The Senators indicated to the Court
that unless judicial action was taken quickly, the Senators' right to
exercise their power in treaty termination might be irreparably lost
by January 1, 1980, for the issue of the termination of the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty would moot the case at bar. The Senators
indicated that their injury could not be redressed through political
channels. They insisted that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 57, they were entitled to a declaratory judgment, as it was the
proper form of relief where no effective alternatives are available.
The President maintained that the Senators lacked standing and
argued that even if the case went to the merits, it would fail to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, for according to the terms
of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the President had the
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constitutional authority to terminate the treaty. The President
further asserted that the Senate vote adopted the Byrd Amendment
in place of the Foreign Relations Committee version which inserted
substitute language recommended by the Committee on the basis of
its hearings. 125 CONG. REc. 5018 (1979). Therefore, the President
stated that the Senate vote did not meet the Court's requirement of
asserting "a right to participate in the treaty termination process."
The major significance of this case is the insistence by the
Senators on maintaining the balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches of government in the area of treaty termina-
tion. It was an effort to uphold the system of checks and balances in
the field of foreign relations, as well as to establish the Senators' con-
stitutional right to participate in treaty termination decisions. Al-
though the Court did not rule on the merits, its comments suffi-
ciently indicated that it concurred with the Senators. At present, the
question of congressional standing in the area of foreign relations has
not been reviewed by the Supreme Court. If the Senators choose to
appeal the Court's June 6, 1979 Order, the Supreme Court may be
confronted with such an issue. For the first time, a United States
Court has had the opportunity to rule directly on the respective roles
of the two political branches in the process of treaty termination. The
Goldwater decision is significant for this reason, regardless of the ul-
timate solution.
ADDENDUM
On October 17, 1979, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the
decision of June 6, 1979. Pursuant to this Order, the President's notice of
termination must receive the approval of either two thirds of the Senate,
or a majority of both houses of Congress, in order for it to be effective. In
addition, the Secretary of State was enjoined from taking any action to
implement the President's notice of termination until that notice is
approved. In issuing this Order, the Court indicated that the vote taken
in the United States Senate to adopt the Byrd Amendment constituted an
injury in fact to the Senators-the necessary element to confer standing.
The Court no longer feared that a decision on the merits would circum-
vent or evade the legislative process.
The Court proceeded to determine the necessary governmental
action required by the Constitution to terminate the 1954 Mutual De-
fense Treaty with Taiwan, and concluded that the termination of a treaty
involves a repeal of the "law of the land" established by the agreement. It
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is in this area that Congressional participation is required. Furthermore,
it is undisputed that the President must submit an amendment to the
terms of any treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent. Therefore, if
the lesser power to amend treaties is denied the President, afortiori, the
greater power to annul should also be denied. Treaty termination is thus
deemed to be a shared power which cannot be exercised by the President
unilaterally.
A notice of appeal has been filed by the government in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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